Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2000

Vickie Jean Butler Heath v. Darrell Eugene Heath :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Paul J. Merrill; Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent.
Richard M. Day; Meredith, Berber & Day; Attorney for Defendant-Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Heath v. Heath, No. 13941.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/75

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

p-^p^

0 rrrv A I L;.
pt**tr*

RT

• ^ c n Ckf: I?

H

Case No. 13941

"EOT

to Set Aside
District
Judge

>AUL J. MERRILL
0 North Main Street
panish Fork, Utah 84660
ttorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

FILED
JUL 1*1975
Cfc*7'wi^Cm^ U**

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

VICKIE JEAN BUTLER HEATH,
Case No* 13941

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vaDARRELL EUGENE HEATH,
Defendant-Appe1lant•

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

Appeal from Order Denying Motion to Set Aside
Default Judgment of the Fourth District
Court, Utah County
Hon» J# Robert Bullock, Judge

PAUL J. MERRILL
30 North Main Street
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

RICHARD M. DAY
MEREDITH, BARBER & DAY
455 South Third East, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

Page
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

1

RELIEF SOUGHT AGAINST APPEAL

.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE
THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE HEREIN

...

5

POINT I .

THE ACTION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS VALID

....

5

POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT WAS RIGHT IN REFUSING TO
SET ASIDE ITS DECREE OF DIVORCE ••

•

8

POINT III.
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT MUST SHOW A MERITORIOUS
DEFENSE...,,..,.
CONCLUSION .

.

10
12

INDEX OF CITATIONS
CASES CITED
Ney v. Harrison, 299 P. 2nd 1116

9

Bylund v. Crook, 60 U. 235, 208 P. 504

9

i

TEXTS CITED
Page
24 Am. J u r . 2d. Necessity for Meritorious Defense,
Sec. 439

10

STUTUTES AND RULES CITED
Sec. 30-3-18, Utah Code Annot. (1953)

5, 6, 7

Sec. 30-3-6, Utah Code Annot. (1953)

7

Sec. 30-3-7, Utah Code Annot. (1953) ....................

7

Sec. 70-30-12, Utah Code Annot. (1953)

11

Rule 55-2 U.R.C.P

5

Rule 5 (a) U.R.C.P.

7

Sec. 60 U.R.C.P

*

9

ii

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

VICKIE JEAN BUTLER HEATH,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

s
:

CASE NO.

13941

-vsX

0ARRELL EUGENE HEATJH,
Defendant and
Appellant#

$

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF CASE

This was an action filed by plaintiff seeking a divorce
from defendant, and that plaintiff be awarded certain various
relief including custody of a minor child and support money#

Upon

the 29th day of April, 1971 the divorce decree was signed by the
Judge and filed in the Office of the Utah County Clerk#

On the

29th day of October, 1974 defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside
the Judgment and Decree of Divorce based on various gronds#

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The lower court, acting through the Hon* Joseph E#
Nelson, signed a Judgment and Decree of Divorce which recited

appellantfs default and awarded respondent, inter alia, a divorce,
custody of the minor child, and $50#00 per month child support;
said Default Judgment was filed on April 29, 1971•

Thereafter,

appellant1s Motion to Set Aside the Judgment and Decree of Divorce
was denied by a Minute Entry denominated "Ruling" signed by the
Hon. J. Robert Bullock, dated December 4, 1974»

RELIEF SOUGHT AGAINST APPEAL
Respondent seeks the affirmation of the lower courtfs
Judgment and Decree and that the Supreme Court set at rest this
case*

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Complaint in this action was verified and filed
on February 4, 1971 (R. 304), together with an Affidavit of
Impecuniosity and an Order to Show Cause and Affidavit*

The

Complaint alleged, inter alia, that the parties to the action
had had one child as issue of their marriage, whose custody
should be awarded to plaintiff (paragraph 3 of complaint, R« 3)*
The Order to Show Cause (R. 8) required defendants appearance
on February 11, 1971, and the Sheriff's Return ($• 11) reflects
that a Summons, Complaint, Order to Show Cause and Restraining
Order were served upon defendant on February 9, 1971• No hear*
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ings were held in connection with the Order to Show Cause (R.
12-13).
On April 28, 1971 the matter was heard by the Court.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment and
Decree of Divorce, were signed on April 29, 1971 and filed in
the Clerk's office on that date (R. 14-16, R. 17-18).

Both of

those documents recited that it appeared Mto the satisfaction
of the court that the defendant herein . •• was duly served in
person with summons herein attached to a copy of the complaint
on file ... . M and that

ff

the defendant (had) failed to appear

and answer the complaint ... the time for answering having expired
and no answer having been filed and the default of said defendant ... having been duly entered according to law/1
Fact No. 5 (R. 15) states:

Finding of

"That because the defendant is using

drugs to excess and at the present time is in jail, the Court
determined there would be no basis for reconciliation of the marriage ;"• Conclusion of Law No. 3 (R. 15) states:

That there is

no basis for reconciliation of the marriage because of the defendants (sic) excessive use of drugs and being in Jail, therefore,
the 90 day waiting period should be waived.ff

The Judgment and

Decree of Divorce (paragraph three) contained an Order (R 17) that
the ninety day waiting period was waived and a default certificate was filed in the clerk's office on April 29, 1971 (R. 20).
-3-

The complaint prayed (paragraph No. 3, R* 4) " $350*00
per month alimony and supportraoney;!fParagraph No« 6 (R* 17-18)
of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce herein awarded plaintiff
$1*00 per year alimony and $50#00 per month child support, and
judgment for $250*00 for the use and benefit of plaintiff's
attorney*
On November 1, 1974, defendant filed a Motion to Set
Aside the Judgment and Decree of Divorce based upon the ground
that said Judgment and Decree were based upon hearing held in
contravention and violation of provisions of Sec* 30-3-18, Utah
Code Annot* (1953), (R* 21), and upon the further ground, as set
forth in defendant's Affidavit (R* 25-26), that the return was
erroneous by reason of the fact that at the time of service recited therein defendant did not reside at nor was he present in,
Salem, Utah, but was in fact involuntarily restrained in the Utah
State Hospital at Provo, Utah, and upon the further ground that
thereafter the defendant was incarcerated in the Utah County Jail
did not intend to default herein, but was discouraged from filing
an Answer to plaintiff's Complaint by jail personnel who stated
to him that he could not be released from custody to attend any
trial in the action in any event*

Said motion was denied by a

ruling of the above Court dated December 4, 1974 (R* 27) and an
additional Order denying the Motion was subsequently signed and
filed herein on December 20, 1974*
-4-

ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANTAPPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND
DECREE OF DIVORCE HEREIN
The lower court had before it the record1 of the trial,
the record shows the defendant-appellant was personally served
with a twenty day Summons and in the affidavit of the defendantappellant to Set Aside the Judgment and Decree of Divorce
defendant-appellant admits he had personal knowledge of the complaint since he contemplated answering the same.

The defendant-

appellant failed to answer said complaint and the court upon the
hearing authorized the default of said defendant-appellant} and
for a good cause being shown waived the remainder of the ninety
day waiting period*

This was done in accordance with 30-3-18}

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended.

The jurisdiction of the

court was had as to the person and res of the suit.

Under Rule

55-2 of Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure, no notice need be given
any defendant in default.

The Legislature in 30-3-18, Utah Code

Annotated, 1953, as Amended does not provide for an additional
hearing for a defendant in default.

Thus we see that no notice

of a subsequent hearing was ever intended to be had or oust the
jurisdiction*
POINT I
THE ACTION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS VALID
Since defendant-appellant had not answered the complaint
-5-

or to the knowledge of the court or plaintiff-respondent or plaintiff •respondentfs attorney attempted to answer the complaint the
court could enter a default judgment.
The court at the time of the hearing further noted that
since the defendant-appellant had been in jail a number of times
and had used drugs there was no hope of reconciliation of the
parties thus the ninety day waiting period should be waived.
The court nor plaintiff-respondent not plaintiff-respondent1s
attorney had any knowledge that the defendant-appellant was being
deprived of his rights in answering the complaint*
The fact that the court did not put this finding, that
said ninety day period would be waived, in its minute entry was
an oversight by the judge who did so order as shown by the fact
that he included it in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Judgment and Decree of Divorce,
The defendant-appellant did not rely upon the statutory
ninety day waiting period since he did not at the ninety day limit
attempt to appear before the court or make any written communication with it,
30-3-18 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (Amended) does not
forbid the court from holding a hearing on the divorce case before the end of the ninety day waiting period nor does the section
allow the defendant-appellant ninety days in which to file an
answer, but rather leaving it to the sound discretion of the court
-6-

to determine the facts*

If the legislature had wanted to extend

the time for answering they would have so stated in the statute;
this they did not do nor did they define "good Cause", thus leavin it up to the court to determine this matter also.

Therefore,

the term "good Cause" as referedto in 30-3-18 UGA 1953 as Mended
is left solely to the discretion of the judge#

Under 30-3-6} 30-3-7

and 30*3-18 UCA 1953 as Amended, the statutes give the trial judge
discretionary power in the matters of waiving the ninety day waiting =
period and the length of time to be waited before the divorce becomes
final*

The defendant-appellant had all the time allowed by law to

answer and prepare a defense to the complaint in said divorce case*
The defendant-appellant has not claimed that he has
any defense to the grounds in said case*

The only things he wants

to contest is the paternity and one item of personal property
which could be done by other proceedings.

Hence, if the Judgment

and Decree of Divorse is set aside the defendant-appellant would
be no futher ahead*
In answer to the defendant-appellant^ claim due to Rule
5 (a) of Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure, it should be noted that
the plaintiff-respondent asked for no new or additional relief,
therefore defendant-appallant was not entitled to notice*
In this case there was really no need for the ninety
day waiting period* or "cooling off" period as there was no attempt
-7-

by the defendant-appellant either before or after the divorce
for reconciliation of the matter*

He had placed himself by his

own actions beyond the point where he could make such a move*
The court must, therefore consider the statutes and
rule thereon*

All the cases I found dealt with the peculiarity

of the statutes in question which were not exactly like those
of Utah.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT WAS RIGHT IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE ITS
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Public Policy dictates that a decree of divorce should
be final and that the parties may rely upon it unless it is challenged within a reasonable time limit*

Section 60 of the Utah

Rules of Civil Proceedure requires that a decree of divorce or
judgment to be set aside must be commenced within a reasonable
time limitt and in no event more than three months*

In this

case defendant-appellant did not seek to set aside the divorce
in a reasonable time limit since he did not seek to set it aside
until more than three years after the decree*
To show an abuse of discretion the Supreme Court of
Utah has held in many cases that the motion must be timely filed*
In this case the defendant-appellant made no aterapt to set aside
the default judgment and relied thereon for a period of more than
three years*

The reliance is shown by the fact he did not attempt

to resume his marital status with the plaintiff•respondent nor

visit the said child.

The following is the ruling of the Supreme

Court of Utah as to abuse of discretion in setting aside judgments:
Echo Ney, Trustee, Wasatch Homes, Inc«, a Corporation
y« G# T. Harrison and Alda J* Harrison, 299 P. 2d 1116#
In the recent case of Warren v. Dixon Ranch Company,
we had occassion to review the policy consideration
and reaffirmed the attitude of liberal consideration,
thus s
The allowance of a vaction of judgment is a creature
of equity designed to relieve against harshness of
enforcing a judgment, which may occur through proceedual difficulties, the wrongs of the opposing party or
misfortunes which prevent the presentation of a claim
or defence, *** Equity considers factors which may be
irrelevant in actions at law, such as the *** hardship
in granting or denying relief. Although an equity
court or longer has complete discretion in granting
or denying relief it may exercise wide judicial discretion in weighing the factors of fairness and public
convenience,^ and this court on appeal will reverse the
trial court only where an abuse of this discretion is
clearly shown#
In the case of Bylund v» Crook, 208 P. 504; 60 U# 285
the following is the ruling of the Supreme Court of Utah in setting aside default judgments:
Our trial courts are usually very liberal in vacating
and setting aside default judgments entered against a
defaulting party by reason of mistake, inadvertence,
or excusable neglect, or in case where there has been
fraud or deceit practiced* Under our practice it is
generally regarded as an abuse of discretion for a
trial court not to vacate and set aside a default judgment when there is any reasonable grounds for doing
so* and timely application is made» But in this particular instance it is our judgment that no reasonable
grounds existed, and that it would have been error
for the court to have done so»
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The sheriff made a return of the service of Summons
and Complaint in the matter in accordance with the Utah Rules
ii

of Civil Proceedure showing that same was served personally
upon the defendant-appellant and the said defendant-appellant
admits that he received the Summons and Complaint*

The plaintiff-

H
11

ii
respondent, in the lower court, had the right to rely on the
service*

In excess of three years had passed before the defend-

ant-appellant made any objections*

Therefore, the defendant-

appellant has no right to claim that the court has abused its
discretion in this regard*
Public Policy dictates that a decree of divorce should
be final and that the parties may rely upon it unless it is chal-

j

3
u
ii

"
g

lenged w i t h i n a reasonable time l i m i t *
POINT I I I
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT MUST SHOW A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE
24 Am. Jur* 2d. 4 7 1 , Sec* 3 3 1 , N e c e s s i t y for M e r i t o r i o u s

ia

1
i

Defense*
The general rule that a defendant against who a
judgment has been rendered must show a meritorius
defense, as a condition of his right to proceed
for the vacation of the judgment, or to seek
equitable relief against the judgment, applies
to a judgment or decree of divorce* It is accordingly held that if the defendant in the divorce
action asks that the decree be set aside he must
ordinarily show that he has a meritorious defense
to the action, making it at least a possibility
that if a new trial is had, the judgment will be
a different one*

I
g
H

'
i
"•
i
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An exception to the rule imposing such a requirement
is made where the attack on the judgment or decree
is made solely on the gounds of want of jurisdiction,
not involving a submission to the jurisdiction of
the court to pass on the merits of the case*
In applying the foregoing rules of law to the instance
case, the defendant-appellant relies solely on the non-access of
defendant-appellant to plaintiff-respondent between October 14,
1968 and October 14, 1969,
1970*

The said child was born on May 5,

The defendant-appellant has not represented to the court

that he had furloughs during that period.

According to the

plaintiff-respondent, defendant-appellant did have furloughs
during his imprisonment and did visit with her and have sexual
relations with her*

However, under the affidavit of the plain-

tiff-respondent, we find the child was not named and a supplemental name report had to be filed with the Utah State Department
of Vital Statistics*
9460*

This was one on certificate number 70-25-

The defendant^appellant signed a notarized supplemental

name report acknowledging he was the father of said child*
defendant-appellant permitted the child to use his name*

The
Under

70-30-12 UCA 1953 it states that if a father publicly acknowledges
a child to be his and so treats him he is regarded as the natural
child of that parent*
When a child is born within wedlock it is the legal
presumption that tjjc married couple is in fact the parents of
the child unless it is disputed by the father at that time,
-11-

which was not done in the case dealt with in this action*

Until

the child was more than four years of age defendant-appellant
did not dispute the fact that the child was his.
Thus we see the defendant-appellant would have no stand
ing to claim the child was not his own,

If anyone misrepresented

to the lower court it would be the defendant-appellant by his
action of trying to set aside the Default Judgment and Decree*
The plaintiff-respondent was satisfied that the child was sired
by the defendant-appellant*

If a new trial was had the outcome

would be tihchanged*
At any time with in the four years after the birth of
the child* the defendant-appellant could have filed an independant action against the plaintiff-respondent to determine the
paternity of the child*

Society has the right to be able to de-

pend on the finality of divorce atters and not have to wonder if
subsequent marriages will be voided at a later date*

Injury to

innocent parties may be had in such cases and should be avoided
at all costs*
CONCLUSION
The lower court had jurisdiction of the persons and
subject matter of said law suit.

Within the discretion of the

lowev court a hearing was held upon the divorce matterj the
iowever court determined the case, filed its Pindgings of Fact
-12-

and Conclusions of Law and Decree and t h e d i v o r c e became f i n a l *
Based upon the b r i e f , p l a i n t i f f - r e s p o n d e n t

p r a y s t h a t t h e Motion

t o Set Aside t h e Default Judgment be denied*

Respectfully

Submitted,

PAUL J , MERRILL
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t
30 North Main S t r e e t
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
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I hereby certify that on this f4

day of July, 1975,

I mailed, postage prepaid, two copies of the foregoing brief to
Richard M» Day, Esq*, Meredith, Barber & Day, 4t 455 South Third
East, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, tit

PAUL J. MERRILL
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